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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

JOEL SILL,

*

Respondent and
Cross-Petitioner,

*
*

Case No. 20060106

v.
*

BILL HART d/b/a HART
CONSTRUCTION,
Petitioner and
Cross-Respondent.

*
*

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS-PETITIONER

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (2002).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW BY PETITIONER
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This Court granted review on two issues presented by petitioner Bill Hart:
1. Whether the requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) apply to
counterclaims; and
2. Whether those requirements apply regardless of the remedies to a property
owner under the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act.
On certiorari, this Court "review[s] the decision of the court of appeals, not the
trial court." Aris Vision Institute, Inc. v. Wasatch Property Management, Inc., 2006

UT 38, 17,

P.3d

(citing Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004

UT 23, f 11, 89 P.3d 155). The court of appeals' interpretation of a statute is
reviewed for correctness. Id. (citing State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, f 6, 63 P.3d
667).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-ll(4)(a) & (e) (2001)1:
(a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this
chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, the lien
claimant shall include with the service of the complaint on the owner of
the residence:
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the owner's
rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien
Recovery Fund Act; and
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable
the owner of the residence to specify the grounds upon which the owner
may exercise available rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act.
* * *

(e) If a lien claimant fails to provide the owner of the residence the
instructions and form affidavit required by Subsection 4(a), the lien
claimant shall be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the
residence.

The version of section 38-1-11(4) set forth here was in effect in 2002 when Hart
served his counterclaim complaint on Sill. In 2004, the legislature amended that section.
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-11(4) (Supp. 2004). None of the amendments, however, is
relevant to the issue before this Court, which must only construe the version of section
38-1-11(4) that was in place in 2002 (subsection (4) was enacted in 2001, effective April
30, 2001). Accordingly, all citations to subsection (4) in this brief are to that version.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
The court of appeals set out in its opinion the following accurate summary of the

nature of this case and the proceedings in the trial court:
Sill is the owner of real property located in Summit County, Utah
(the Property). Hart, a general contractor, began construction on the
Property in the summer of 1999 and continued until approximately
December 2001, at which time Hart left the job over a dispute with Sill
regarding the completion of the project. In January 2002, Sill brought an
action against Hart, alleging (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (3) breach of fiduciary duty, (4)
negligent misrepresentation, (5) intentional misrepresentation, (6) unjust
enrichment, and (7) defamation. Hart counterclaimed in February 2002,
alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment, and seeking to
foreclose a mechanics' lien on the Property.
More than two and a half years later, in October 2004, Sill for the
first time raised the issue of Hart's compliance with Utah Code section
38-1-1 l(4)(a). See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001). The parties
reserved the issue for post verdict determination, and the case went to
trial one week later. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Hart in the
amount of $314,500 on Hart's unjust enrichment and mechanics' lien
claims. In addition, Hart was awarded prejudgment interest, attorney
fees, and court costs on his mechanics' lien claim.
Hart thereafter sought to reduce the verdict to judgment. Sill
opposed the effort insofar as it related to Hart's mechanics' lien claim.
Sill argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear Hart's
mechanics' lien claim because Hart, when he served his counterclaim on
Sill, did not include the instructions nor the form affidavit and motion for
summary judgment required by section 38-1-1 l(4)(a). Hart disagreed,
arguing that only plaintiffs filing a "complaint" - as opposed to those
filing a counterclaim - are required to comply with section 38-1-1 l(4)(a).
The trial court agreed with Hart and entered judgment in his favor on both
the unjust enrichment and the mechanics' lien claims. The court also

awarded Hart prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and court costs on his
mechanics' lien claim. Sill timely appealed.2
Sill v. Hart, 2005 UT App 537, ft 2-4, 128 P.3d 1215 (footnote omitted).
The Court of Appeals
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling in favor of Hart on his
mechanics' lien claim. Applying the well-established rules of statutory construction
that a court looks to the plain language of the statute to determine its meaning and that a
court does not infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there, the court
of appeals held that under the proper interpretation of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a), Hart - a
"lien claimant" - was required to serve the papers referenced in that section when he
served his counterclaim on Sill. Sill, 2005 UT App 537, M 8-13. The court rejected
the trial court's and Hart's view that the term "complaint" as used in subsection (4)(a)
referred only to the initial pleading filed by a plaintiff to commence a lawsuit and did
not include a defendant's counterclaim initiating an action to enforce a lien filed under
the mechanics' lien statutes. Id, The court noted that "although the statute specifically
references 'the service of a complaint,' the term 'complaint' is frequently interpreted in
Utah caselaw as including counterclaims[.]" Id. at \ 13. And, noting that "the statute
at issue applies to a lien claimant filing 'an action to enforce a lien filed under [the
mechanics' lien statutes] [,]'" the court observed that "Utah courts have interpreted

2

Sill paid Hart the $314,500 awarded him on the unjust enrichment claim. Sill also has
paid Hart the $5,598.92 awarded him in costs. (R. 1496, Partial Satisfaction of
Judgment).
A

similar language to include counterclaims." Id. at 1 12 (first brackets in original). It
therefore rejected the trial court's and Hart's contention that because Hart had served a
"counterclaim" rather than a "complaint," the requirement to serve the papers
referenced in subsection (4)(a) did not apply to him. Id. at 1 13.
The court of appeals also rejected Hart's arguments that subsection (4)(a) did not
apply to him because (1) he had not ufile[d] an action" in this case (according to him,
only Sill had done that) and (2) Sill ultimately had no right to relief under the Residence
Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act (LRFA).3 It concluded that subsection
(4)(a) clearly applied to Hart, noting that under (4)(a)'s plain language "the statute here
is triggered if a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under the Mechanics'
Liens Act involving a residence as defined by section 38-11-102" - precisely what Hart
had done in filing his counterclaim against Sill. Sill, 2005 UT App 537 t l 9-10. As
for Hart's contention that because Sill ultimately had no right to relief under the LRFA,
the court concluded that "the responsibility of determining whether the owner being
sued has rights under the [LRFA] does not belong to the lien claimant." Id. at 1 9 n.3.
In short, that was not a basis for Hart to avoid the requirements of (4)(a).
Having interpreted (4)(a) to apply to Hart, the court of appeals rejected Sill's
argument that Hart's failure to comply with (4)(a) deprived the trial court of jurisdiction
to hear Hart's lien foreclosure action. Instead, it held that "Hart's failure to comply

3

Title 38, Chapter 11 of the Utah Code.

with [that] section * * * 'constitutes] an avoidance or affirmative defense' under rule
8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. at 1 15.
Hart filed a petition for rehearing, which was denied. This Court then granted
his petition for certiorari and Sill's cross-petition.
B.

Statement of Relevant Facts
It is undisputed that when Hart served his counterclaim complaint (setting forth

the mechanic's lien foreclosure action) on Sill in 2002, Hart did not include with the
complaint the instructions and forms described in subsection (4)(a). That is the only
fact relevant to the issues presented for review.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001), a provision in Utah's
mechanics' lien statutes, a lien claimant who files "an action" against an owner of a
residence to enforce a mechanics' lien must serve on the owner certain instructions and
forms with the "complaint" that initiates the foreclosure action. In light of this Court's
and the court of appeals' case law that makes clear that a counterclaim institutes "an
action," and the common understanding that the term "complaint" includes a
counterclaim, the court of appeals correctly interpreted subsection (4)(a) to apply to Bill
Hart, who, as a lien claimant, filed an action by way of a counterclaim to enforce his
mechanics' lien against Joel Sill's property.
That interpretation of the statute is in harmony with settled rules of statutory
construction, namely that when construing a statute, a court (1) must read the plain

language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions consistently with other
statutes in the same chapter and related chapters, (2) must assume that each statutory
term is used advisedly and that the intent of the legislature is revealed by the use of the
term in the context and structure in which it is placed, and (3) must consider as its
primary goal giving effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the statute's plain
language and the purpose the statute was meant to achieve.
ARGUMENT
The court of appeals correctly interpreted the plain language of subsection (4) (a) to
require Hart, a lien claimant, to serve with his counterclaim complaint the
instructions and forms identified in that provision.
A.

In construing subsection (4)(a), the court of appeals correctly concluded that
the term "complaint" includes a counterclaim.
Hart argues that the court of appeals violated two rules of statutory construction

by interpreting the term "complaint" as used in subsection (4)(a) to include a
counterclaim: (1) a court must assume that each term was used advisedly and thus the
statutory words must be read literally, and (2) a court may not infer substantive terms
into the text that are not already there. The premise for that argument is that neither
standing alone nor in the context of subsection (4)(a) is the term "complaint"
reasonably interpreted to include a counterclaim. As shown below, that premise lacks
support in precedent from both the Utah courts and courts in other jurisdictions, and in
the major treatises.

1.

The meaning of "an action" in subsection (4) (a)

Subsection (4)(a) provides:
If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under [the
mechanics' lien statutes] involving a residence, as defined in Section 3811-102, the lien claimant shall include with the service of the complaint
on the owner of the residence [certain instructions and papers.]
The term "complaint" as used in that provision must be interpreted in the context in
which it used. See Ward v. Richfield City, 716 P.2d 265, 266 (Utah 1984) (this Court
assumes that "each term [in a statute] is used advisedly and that the intent of the
Legislature is revealed in the use of the term in the context and structure in which it is
placed"). "Complaint" refers back to "an action" filed by a lien claimant to enforce a
lien. Thus, the starting point for determining the meaning of "complaint" is the
meaning of the term "action."
In American Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Communications Corp., 939 P. 2d
185 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), a case decided four years before the legislature enacted
subsection (4)(a), the court of appeals interpreted the phrase "action brought to enforce
any lien under this chapter" in UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-18(1) (Supp. 1996) (the
provision relating to the award of attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party in a
mechanics' lien action) to include a counterclaim. The court held that "a counterclaim
to foreclose [a] mechanics' lien[] * * * clearly qualifies as 'an action brought to enforce
any lien' under the mechanics' lien statute." 939 P.2d at 193. The court of appeals'
holding in the instant case that the nearly identical phrase at the beginning of subsection

(4)(a) - "an action to enforce a lien filed under this chapter" - also includes a
counterclaim (and thus the word "complaint," which follows that phrase and is used
with no qualifying or limiting language, naturally would include a counterclaim) is in
harmony with settled rules of statutory construction. Specifically, in construing a
statute, a court assumes that when the legislature enacted the statute, it was aware of
prior court decisions interpreting similar statutory language. Donahue v. Warner Bros.
Picture Distributing Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 261, 272 P.2d 177, 180 (1954). In short,
nothing in the plain language of subsection (4)(a) suggests that the legislature intended
for the "action" referenced therein to have a more limited scope than the "action"
referenced in section 38-1-18(1), which the court of appeals previously had interpreted
in American Rural Cellular to include a counterclaim.
In an effort to avoid the court of appeals' construction of the term "action" in
American Rural Cellular, Hart argues that the language of section 38-1-18(1) is very
different from the language in subsection (4)(a), because the word "any" is in front of
the word "action" in section 38-1-18 and not in subsection (4)(a). He contends that
"any action" and "an action" are so significantly different that one is compelled to
conclude that "an action" in subsection (4)(a) does not include a counterclaim. As
explained below, that the legislature intended such fine distinctions between the words
used in section 38-1-18 and the nearly identical words used in subsection (4)(a) simply
is not apparent from either American Rural Cellular or the plain language of subsection
(4)(a).

At bottom, Hart's argument on this point is anchored in his contention that the
legislature's use in subsection (4)(a) of the term "complaint," which he insists must be
interpreted narrowly to refer only to an original complaint filed by a plaintiff, reflects
an intent to limit the scope of the term "action" to an original action filed by a lien
claimant as a plaintiff. That construction, however, is plausible only if one accepts
Hart's position that the undefined term "complaint" - standing alone without any
limiting language - is not reasonably interpreted as including a counterclaim and
necessarily means only an original complaint filed by a plaintiff. That view is contrary
to the prevailing view that a counterclaim is a complaint and that when Ihe term
"complaint" is used in a statute with no qualifying language, it naturally includes a
counterclaim.
In American Rural Cellular, the court of appeals specifically held that "a
counterclaim to foreclose [a] mechanics' lien * * * clearly qualifies as 'an action
brought to enforce any lien' under the mechanics' lien statute." 939 P.2d at 193. It
expressly said the words "an action" included a counterclaim, thus placing no
significance on the word "any" that preceded the word "action" in section 38-1-18(1).
Assuming - as one must - that the legislature was aware of American Rural Cellular
when it drafted subsection (4)(a), its use of "an action" in the introductory clause can
only be interpreted to carry the same meaning as the court of appeals gave "an action"
in American Rural Cellular - that is, "an action" includes a counterclaim.

Had the more restrictive reading of subsection (4)(a) Hart proposes been
intended, the legislature - mindful of the construction of "an action" in American Rural
Cellular - certainly would have made explicit an intent to limit subsection (4)(a)'s reach
to an original complaint filed by a lien claimant as a plaintiff. It is unreasonable to
think, as Hart would have it, that the legislature used in subsection (4)(a) the words "an
action" - precisely the words the court of appeals said included a counterclaim - but
intended to leave to the reader of (4)(a) the task of divining a contrary legislative intent
to give those words a meaning different from that determined in American Rural
Cellular. Had the legislature intended the restriction Hart says it did, it would have
made that intention clear by providing, for example: "If a lien claimant files an action,
as a plaintiff in an original complaint and not as a counterclaimant, to enforce a lien
filed under this chapter * * *." To think otherwise is to ascribe to the legislature a
hide-the-ball attitude in its enactment of subsection (4)(a) that simply is not suggested in
anything Hart cites to this Court.
2.

The meaning of "complaint" in subsection (4) (a)

With the foregoing statutory context in mind {i.e., as used in subsection (4)(a),
"an action" plainly includes a counterclaim), Hart's proposed interpretation of the term
"complaint" now can be addressed. He contends that because that term is not
commonly understood to include a counterclaim, the legislature must have intended for
"complaint" to limit the scope of "an action," which precedes "complaint" in
subsection (4)(a), to an original complaint filed by a lien claimant as a plaintiff, thereby

excluding a counterclaim complaint from subsection (4)(a)'s coverage. For the
following reasons, that argument fails.
Hart first cites definitions of "complaint" from Black's Law Diclionary and Rule
3(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as support for his apparent contention that an
"action" can only be commenced by a plaintiffs original complaint accompanied by
service of a summons. Pet.'s Br. 13-14. He reasons, therefore, that when the
legislature referenced a "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a), it must have intended to
restrict the application of that provision to a plaintiff lien claimant who files an original
complaint and to exclude the defendant lien claimant who files a counterclaim
complaint.
The fundamental problem with that analysis is that rides on the notion that a
counterclaim does not commence an "action" under Utah law. That simply is
incorrect. As this Court said long ago, "[a] counterclaim is viewed as an original
action, instituted by the defendant against the plaintiff and is tested by the same tests
and rules as a complaint." Harman v. Yeager, 103 Utah 208, 134 P.2d 695, 696
(1943). See also State ex rel Road Comm'n v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65, 368 P.2d 585,
587 (1962) ("[N]either under our rules or elsewhere, can a counterclainiant cast himself
in any other role than that of a plaintiff."), overruled in part on other grounds,
Coleman v. State Lands Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990). That view is the prevailing
view in this country. See, e.g., Kane v. Kane, 558 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (A.D. 1990)
("A counterclaim is in essence a complaint by a defendant against the plaintiff and

alleges a present viable cause of action upon which the defendant seeks judgment. It is
not a responsive pleading merely because it is contained in a responsive paper; to wit,
the answer. It is not a defense. * * * The pleader of a counterclaim is a plaintiff in his
own right." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure, § 1184 at 24-25 (3d ed. 2004) ("Since a counterclaim basically
is a defendant's complaint, it is perfectly logical to oblige a plaintiff to respond to it."
(emphasis added)).4
Hart next cites Rules 7(a) and 13(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
asserts that the "Utah Rules of Civil Procedure recognize 'complaints' and
counterclaims as distinct and different, including defining them in completely different
rules." Neither of those rules, however, supports his view that "complaint" as used in
Subsection (4)(a) cannot include a counterclaim.
Rule 7(a) defines "pleadings":
Pleadings, There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a
counterclaim; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a crossclaim; a third-party complaint, if a person who was not an original party

4

Not surprisingly, the courts - this Court included - frequently refer to the pleading
that sets forth a counterclaim as a "counterclaim complaint." See, e.g., Lundahl v.
Quinn, 2003 UT 11, f 1, 67 P.3d 1000 ("she has filed a motion to intervene and an
amended counterclaim complaint"); Berckeley Investment Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 259
F.3d 135, 138 (3rd Cir. 2001) ("Colkitt reasserted those counterclaims not dismissed
with prejudice in an amended counterclaim complaint"); Foundation for Interior Design
Educ. Res. v. Savannah College of Art & Design, 244 F.3d 521, 531 (6th Cir. 2001)
("College alleged in its counterclaim complaint * * *"); Federal Kemper Life Assur.
Co. v. Ellis, 28 F.3d 1033, 1038 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Defendant then filed a motion for
leave to file an answer and amended counterclaim complaint").

is summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party answer, if
a third-party complaint is served.
Hart acknowledges that a counterclaim is a "pleading." See Pet.'s Br. 15 (arguing that
had the legislature intended for Subsection (4)(a) to apply to a counterclaim, it "could
have used the term 'pleading' instead of 'complaint'").
Assuming that when the legislature drafted subsection (4)(a) it looked to Rule
7(a) for a "pleading" that would cover both an original complaint and a counterclaim, it
necessarily would have chosen "complaint" from the list of "pleadings" contained in
that rule. That is so because "counterclaim" is not expressly set forth in Rule 7(a), and
thus a "counterclaim" - acknowledged to be a "pleading" - must be subsumed in the
term "complaint." A counterclaim certainly is not an "answer," a "reply to a
counterclaim," an "answer to a cross-claim," a "third-party complaint," or a "thirdparty answer" - the other "pleadings" listed in Rule 7(a), all of which the legislature
naturally would have rejected as not descriptive of a counterclaim. On the other hand,
selection of the term "complaint" from Rule 7(a) would be entirely consistent with the
prevailing view of courts and commentators that a counterclaim is a complaint, it just is
one filed by a defendant against a plaintiff. Rule 7(a) therefore does not advance Hart's
contention that the legislature, by using the term "complaint" in subsection (4)(a), must
have intended a reference only to an original complaint filed by a plaintiff.5

5

The trial court also cited Rule 7(a) in support of its conclusion that the term
"complaint" in subsection (4)(a) does not include a counterclaim. Memorandum
Decision 3 (copy contained in Addendum No. 3 to Hart's opening brief). The court

As for Rule 13(a), which talks about compulsory counterclaims, it is not clear
why Hart believes that rule compels such a clear distinction between a counterclaim and
a complaint that the legislature could not have intended that the term "complaint" in
subsection (4)(a) include a counterclaim. Nothing in the plain language of Rule 13(a)
suggests that a counterclaim is not a complaint. Moreover, Rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure recognizes that a complaint and a counterclaim are in substance the
same pleading:
Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief,
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim,
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief
to which he deems himself entitled.
In short, the rules Hart cites do not advance his argument.6
Significantly, and perhaps most telling, is that Hart does not cite a single
decision where a court has construed the statutory term "complaint" not to include a
counterclaim. Indeed, numerous courts faced with the question have construed the term
to include a counterclaim. See, e.g., Uncle Henry's, Inc. v. Plaut Consulting, Inc.,
382 F.Supp.2d 150, 154 (D. Me. 2005) ("I conclude that the only reasonable way to
read the statute is to interpret the word 'complaint' to mean the pleading asserting the
described Rule 7(a) as "distinguishing a complaint from other pleadings"; however, it
failed to observe that Rule 7(a) does not distinguish a "complaint" from a "counterclaim."
6

Hart's cites UTAH CODE ANN. § 42-2-10 (2005) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-35 (2002)
as support for his argument that the legislature intended to limit the word "complaint" as
used in subsection (4)(a) to an original complaint filed by lien claimant as a plaintiff and

claim in question, here Plaut Consulting^ counterclaim."); Wilson v. Baldwin, 519
S.E.2d 251, 253 (Ga. App. 1999) (noting that the term "complaint" equates with the
term "counterclaim" for purposes of the statute at issue); Brink's Inc. v. City of New
York, 533 F.Supp. 1122, 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("The City's argument that section
203(c) does not apply because the statute uses the term 'complaint,' whereas in the
instant case Brink's is attempting to assert the recoupment against a 'counterclaim' is
without merit; indeed, it borders on the frivolous."); Breech v. Hughes Tool Co., 41
Del. Ch. 128, 189 A.2d 428, 429-30 (Del. 1963) (statute providing that if it appears in
any "complaint" filed in chancery court that a defendant is a nonresident, court may
order his appearance and may provide for seizure of his property, is not to be strictly
construed to end that "complaint" exclude a counterclaim, but rather a counterclaim
against a nonresident is within the purview of the statute).7

not as a counterclaimant. Pet.'s Br. 14. Those statutes do not help him, because they do
not mirror the context in which "complaint" is used in subsection (4)(a).
7

In the court of appeals, Hart argued that Wilson v. Baldwin and Brinks, Inc. v. City of
New York supported the trial court's construction of subsection (4)(a) rather than the one
the court of appeals adopted. Those cases, however, do support the court of appeals'
construction. In Wilson, the statute at issue prohibited bringing "a complaint seeking to
obtain a change of legal custody" of a child "[a]s a counterclaim." Wilson, 519 S.E.2d at
327. That statutory prohibition illustrates the common understanding that the term
"complaint" includes a counterclaim. If that were not the commonly understood meaning
of "complaint," there would be no need for an express prohibition against bringing a
complaint in the form of a counterclaim. The absence of similar limiting language with
respect to the term "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a) indicates a legislative intent that
"complaint" be given its commonly understood meaning (i.e., the term includes a
counterclaim), (continued on next page)

What Hart cannot avoid is that the term "complaint," when used in the absence
of limiting language, is commonly understood to include a counterclaim. See, e.g.,
Liberty Chevrolet, Inc. v. Rainey, 791 N.E.2d 625, 629 (111. App. 2003) ("[W]e agree
with the trial court that, under the Agreement, a counterclaim is a 'complaint.'");
Lebrecht v. Orefice, 105 N.Y.S.2d 318, 320 (N.Y. 1951) ("In the absence of language
indicating a legislative intent that Section 23 * * * shall be inapplicable to
counterclaims, this court is of the opinion that Section 23 applies equally to complaints
and counterclaims, since for all practical purposes the counterclaim is the same as a
complaint."); Quality Clothes Shop v. Keeney, 106 N.E. 541, 542 (Ind. App. 1914)
("It would seem, therefore, that, by the express language of the statute, a counterclaim
is a complaint, and the courts have held repeatedly that a counterclaim is similar in
character to a complaint, and is, in fact, in the nature of a complaint against the
plaintiff.").

(cont.)
The Brink's court, in construing the statutory term "complaint" in one statute to
include a counterclaim, relied on the following language from another statute: "A cause
of action contained in a counterclaim or a cross-claim shall be treated, as far as
practicable, as if it were contained in a complaint." Brink's Inc., 533 F.Supp. at 1123 n.3.
Direct parallels to that provision exist in Utah law. As noted above, it is well-settled in
this state that "[a] counterclaim is viewed as an original action, instituted by the
defendant against the plaintiff and is tested by the same tests and rules as a complaint."
Harman, 134 P.2d at 696. Further, under Rule 8(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a
counterclaim must meet precisely the same standards as a complaint. Those parallels lead
one to the same conclusion that the Brink's court reached: the term "complaint" includes
a counterclaim.

3.

The Second Circuit's decision in Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal InVl
v. Pelella

Lacking any persuasive authority to support his view that the term "complaint"
is not commonly understood to include a counterclaim, Hart offers Local Union No. 38}
Sheet Metal Workers Int'l v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73 (2nd Cir. 2003), as support for his
position that the word "complaint" in subsection (4)(a) must be read as limiting the
word "action" to an action commenced by an original complaint filed by a lien claimant
as a plaintiff. The principal point from Pelella he asks this Court to consider is the
two-judge majority's conclusion that the term "action," as used in section 101(a)(4) of
the federal Labor-Management Reporting and Act, does not embrace a counterclaim,
because "action" is qualified by the phrase "to institute." Hart argues by analogy that
the term "action" in subsection (4)(a), because it is qualified by the subsequent phrase
"service of the complaint," likewise does not embrace a counterclaim. For the
following reasons, that analogy does not work.
The Pelella majority's construction of "action" was based on the view that "[a]
defendant does not 'institute' an action when he asserts a counterclaim." 350 F.3d at
82. According to the majority, an action is only "instituted" when a plaintiff files a
complaint and "[i]n sharp contrast, a defendant asserts a counterclaim in response to a
plaintiff's institution of an action." Id. Thus, the "sharp contrast" the majority found
between a "complaint" and a "counterclaim" lay in the perception that one does not
"institute an action" by filing a counterclaim. Hart asks this Court to adopt essentially

the same view and apply it in construing the terms "action" and "complaint" in
subsection (4)(a). Pet.'s Br. 20 ("[Pelella] also confirms that a counterclaim is
properly considered as something in 'sharp contrast' from a 'complaint.' Subsection
(4)(a) does not apply to this case in which Hart did not file this 'action' nor serve a
'complaint[.]'").
The problem with Hart's invitation to adopt the Pelella majority's reasoning in
interpreting subsection (4)(a) is that the majority's major premise - that one does not
institute an action through a counterclaim - is directly contrary to Utah law. As
previously noted, this Court has made clear that "[a] counterclaim is viewed as an
original action, instituted by the defendant against the plaintiff and is tested by the same
tests and rules as a complaint," Harmon, 134 P.2d at 696. Further, the court of
appeals held in American Rural Cellular that "an action" included a counterclaim. This
Court in Harmon, like many other courts across the country, correctly equated a
counterclaim with a complaint. Hart cannot escape that. Nor can it be assumed that
the legislature, when it enacted subsection (4)(a), was unaware of Harman, which
expresses the clear majority view that a counterclaim is in substance a complaint. In
short, Pelella is inapposite; its reasoning cannot be harmonized with settled Utah law.8

In a well-reasoned opinion, the dissenting judge in Pelella concluded that "the right to
'institute an action' includes the right to assert a counterclaim." 350 F.3d at 92 (Straub,
J., dissenting). Thus, the dissent's analysis is consistent with Utah law, not the
majority's.

4.

Summary

Given the juxtaposition of the terms "action" and "complaint" in subsection
(4)(a), this Court's and the court of appeals' pre-S/// v. Hart decisions making clear that
"an action" may be instituted by a counterclaim, and the common understanding of the
word "complaint" to include a counterclaim, the court of appeals correctly interpreted
subsection (4)(a) to apply to counterclaims. It faithfully applied the principles that, in
construing a statute, a court must look to its plain language as a whole, Miller v.
Weaver, 2003 UT 12, t 17, 66 P.3d 592, and must interpret a statutory term according
to its commonly understood meaning. Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673, 675 (Utah
1989). Moreover, the court of appeals' interpretation of (4)(a) is in harmony with the
statute's obvious purpose, which is to ensure that a homeowner is informed of his or
her rights under the LRFA when a lien claimant brings an action against the
homeowner to enforce a mechanics' lien. See Board ofEduc. of Jordan School Dist. v.
Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37, if 8, 94 P.3d 234 (a court's "aim in construing a statute
is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant
to achieve.").
B.

The plain language of subsection (4)(a) requires that all lien claimants,
including general or original contractors like Hart, comply with its
provisions.
Apparently as an alternative to his argument that subsection (4)(a) does not apply

to counterclaims because it references service of a "complaint," Hart contends that, in
any event, (4)(a) did not require him to serve the referenced instructions and forms

because Sill had no rights under the LRFA with respect to Hart, a general or original
contractor (hereafter simply "general contractor"). Hart reasons that because the
LRFA gives a homeowner rights only with respect to subcontractors, the legislature
could not have intended for subsection (4)(a) to apply to a general contractor like
himself.9 As explained below, that argument fails for a variety of reasons.
1.

Subsection (4)(a)'s plain language

The initial problem with Hart's argument is that it fails to recognize that
subsection (4)(a), by its terms, sets a notice requirement that applies to all lien
claimants. As previously noted, the clear purpose of (4)(a) is to ensure that a
homeowner is alerted to the rights created by the LRFA when a lien claimant brings an
action to enforce a mechanics' lien. Under the plain language of (4)(a), a "lien
claimant" who "files an action to enforce a lien filed under [the mechanics' lien
statutes] involving a residence" must serve with the "complaint" (which, as previously
discussed, naturally includes a counterclaim complaint) certain instructions and forms
relating to the LRFA. Hart argues that notwithstanding that plain language, (4)(a) is
not reasonably interpreted to obligate a general contractor like himself - as opposed to a
subcontractor - to comply with its requirements, because the LRFA only applies to
claims and liens of subcontractors, not to those of general contractors. The
Although Hart does not come right out and say it, his argument necessarily applies to
any general contractor who brings an action to enforce a mechanics' lien against a
homeowner, whether that is by the filing of an original complaint as a plaintiff or by the
filing of a counterclaim as a defendant. In other words, Hart's argument is that

fundamental problem with that argument is that the plain language of (4)(a) must be
ignored to adopt Hart's view.
Nowhere in the mechanics' lien statutes, subsection (4)(a) included, is there so
much as a hint that "lien claimant" does not include a general contractor like Hart.
Where the legislature intended to draw distinctions between a general (or original)
contractor and a subcontractor, it used those specific terms to distinguish the two. See,
e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 38-1-2 (defining and distinguishing "original contractor" and
"subcontractor"), -14 (separating "original contractors" and "subcontractors"), -17
(separating "contractor" and "subcontractor") (2005). Thus, on its face, subsection
(4)(a)'s requirement that the "lien claimant" serve certain instructions and forms on the
sued homeowner applies to anyone who has filed a lien under the mechanics' lien
statutes, including a general contractor. Had the legislature intended to limit the reach
of subsection (4)(a) to subcontractors, then it would have said just that - for example:
"If a lien claimant who is a subcontractor files an action to enforce a lien * * *."
There also is no merit to Hart's additional argument that subsection (4)(a) does
not apply in the situation where the homeowner ultimately is unable to exercise rights
under the LRFA. Subsection (4)(a) does not limit the instructions/forms requirement to
those situations where the homeowner ultimately is able to exercise rights under the
LRFA. Nor does it exempt from that requirement a lien claimant who may believe the

subsection (4)(a) does not apply to a general contractor under any circumstances, because
the homeowner has no rights against a general contractor under the LRFA.

owner has no such rights. Subsection (4)(a) simply sets forth a notice requirement with
which the lien claimant must comply.
Hart's view that serving the required instructions and forms on Sill or other
homeowners in his position would be useless is of no import. The legislature has
decided otherwise, and "[i]t is not the function of this Court to evaluate the wisdom or
practical necessities of legislative enactments." Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County
Commission, 624 P.2d 1138, 1143 (Utah 1981). Obviously, the legislature did not
want the lien claimant deciding whether the homeowner in a given case is eligible for
relief under the LRFA; it wanted to ensure that the sued owner would be the one
making that determination, informed by the instructions and forms served in
compliance with subsection (4)(a). Hart cannot escape the mandatory requirements of
subsection (4)(a) simply because he thinks they are a bad idea under certain
circumstances. See LKL v. Farley, 2004 UT 51, 1 8, 94 P.3d 279 (rejecting
condominium owners' broad interpretation of the term "residences" as used in the
LRFA as contrary to the statutory definition, and observing that although "their
argument might represent good policy, * * * [i]n order for this court to accept the
owners' position and affirm the trial court, we would be forced to ignore a clear
statutory mandate and render the definition chosen by the legislature meaningless").
Instructive on this point is Landmark Systems, Inc. v. Delmar Redevelopment
Corp., 900 S.W.2d 258 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995), where the Missouri Court of Appeals
correctly rejected a similar attack on a notice requirement in that state's mechanic's lien

statutes. There, the lien claimant argued that its failure to comply with the requirement
should not bar its lien because the liened property owner was "a large corporation
sophisticated in the areas of real estate and construction" and "had knowledge of the
mechanic's lien law." 900 S.W.2d at 261. The court disagreed:
It is true, as [the lien claimant] suggests, the purpose of § 429.012
is to warn inexperienced property owners of the danger to them which
lurks in the mechanic's lien statute. However, this court is also aware the
requirements of our statute are mandatory. The statute does not limit the
necessity of this notice to those inexperienced with, or having lack of
knowledge about, the mechanic's lien laws. The statute has no exceptions
and this court will not accept the invitation to create an exception in this
case. Additionally, * * * allowing a lien where there was not substantial
compliance with the notice provision contained in § 429.012 would add
another issue to each mechanic's lien case, namely the extent of the
property owner's knowledge of the mechanic's lien laws. The fact such
an exception was not incorporated into the statute indicates the legislature
did not intend such a result.
900 S.W.2d at 261-62 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
That analysis applies with equal force here in determining the reach of
subsection (4)(a). Whether the circumstances in any given case are such that a
homeowner is or is not in a position to exercise rights under the LRFA may be an issue
in many mechanics' lien cases when litigation begins. It is precisely for that reason that
the legislature could have reasonably determined that subsection (4)(a)'s requirements
would apply to all lien claimants, thereby avoiding litigation on the question of whether

a lien claimant in a particular case justifiably decided not to provide the homeowner
with the instructions and forms.10
In sum, subsection (4)(a) plainly applies to all lien claimants, Hart included.
The legislature did not carve out any exceptions to the instructions and forms
requirement, and this Court should not create one.11

Hart makes much out of the reference to "available rights" in subsection (4)(a)(ii),
arguing that because Sill had no rights against him as a general contractor, he therefore
was relieved of any obligation to comply with subsection (4)(a). As previously
discussed, had the legislature intended to exempt general contractors from the
requirements of (4)(a), it would have made that explicit by limiting "lien claimant" to
subcontractors. Despite all of Hart's protestations, the plain language of (4)(a) requires
all lien claimants who bring an action to enforce a mechanics' lien - general contractors
and subcontractors alike - to serve the instructions and forms. That the "available rights"
for a homeowner under the LRFA may only be against subcontractors is of no
consequence. The legislature obviously intended for this notice provision to apply to all
lien claimants. In any event, even if Hart's tortured interpretation of (4)(a)(ii) were
correct, the "available rights" language only refers to the "form affidavit and motion for
summary judgment" that must be served; there is no similar language in (4)(a)(i), which
requires that the "instructions" be served. Thus, even under Hart's proposed
interpretation of (4)(a)(ii), he still would not be relieved of the obligation to serve the
instructions under (4)(a)(i). He, of course, failed to do that.
Additionally, Hart takes issue with the court of appeals' statement that "the
responsibility of determining whether the owner being sued has rights under the [LRFA]
does not belong to the lien claimant." Sill, 2005 UT App at \ 9 n.3 (Pet.'s Br. 26). He
insists that because he is a general contractor, as opposed to a subcontractor, subsection
(4)(a) must be construed not to apply to him. Again, Hart is asking this Court, as he did
the court of appeals, to ignore the plain language of the statute, which obligates a "lien
claimant" to do certain things, drawing no distinction between the lien claimant who is a
general contractor and the lien claimant who is a subcontractor.
The legislative history Hart cites provides him no help. It only confirms what the
parties have acknowledged all along: The LRFA applies to claims and liens by
subcontractors. That fact does not alter the analysis of what legislative intent the plain
language of subsection (4)(a) reflects, insofar as the notice requirements in that provision
are concerned.

2.

The statutory scheme

The additional flaw in Hart's argument that subsection (4)(a) could not apply to
general contractors due to the reference to the LRFA is that it ignores other related
statutory provisions which undermine that view. A quick look at the statutory scheme
the legislature has adopted for providing a homeowner notice of LRFA rights illustrates
the point.
Hart's implicit argument that the legislature could not have intended to require a
general contractor (as opposed to a subcontractor) to give the homeowner notice of
rights under the LRFA through the service of the papers specified in subsection (4)(a) is
defeated by other provisions in the mechanics' lien statutes. Two prominent provisions
illustrate that the legislature intended to require a general contractor to give the
homeowner notice of LRFA rights throughout the contractor-homeowner relationship.
First, a general contractor has a statutory obligation to give the homeowner
notice of those rights early on in that relationship:
Beginning July 1, 1995, the original contractor or real estate
developer shall state in the written contract with the owner what actions
are necessary for the owner to be protected under Section 38-11-107
[(part of the LRFA)] from the maintaining of a mechanic's lien or other
civil action against the owner or the owner-occupied residence to recover
monies owed for qualified services.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-11-108(1) (2005). Second, a lien claimant - whether a general
contractor or a subcontractor - is required to inform the homeowner of LRFA rights at
the time the lien is filed:

(2) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall contain a statement
setting forth:
* * #

(h) if the lien is on an owner-occupied residence, as defined in
Section 38-11-102, a statement describing what steps an owner, as defined
in Section 38-11-102, may take to require a lien claimant to remove the
lien in accordance with Section 38-11-107.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-7(2)(a)(ix) (2005).
The foregoing provisions obviously are relevant to determining what the
legislature intended in adopting the strict notice requirement for a lien claimant that
appears in section 38-1-1 l(4)(a). A court must "read the plain language of the statute
as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same
chapter and related chapters:' Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, 1 17, 66 P.3d 592
(emphasis added). When the entire statutory scheme is considered, one is unable to
conclude, as Hart contends, that the legislature intended to exclude a general contractor
when it referenced "lien claimant" in subsection (4)(a).
C.

The court of appeals' construction of subsection (4)(a) does not undermine
the basic purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes.
Hart's final attack on the court of appeals' interpretation of subsection (4)(a) is

that it undermines the intent and purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes. Specifically,
he contends that the court of appeals' decision is is contrary to "[t]he purpose of the
mechanic's lien * * * to protect those whose labor or materials have enhanced the value
of property." A.K.& R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47,

1 24, 94 P.3d 270. See Pet. 's Br. 29-31. He apparently is of the view that any
homeowner-protective interpretation of a provision in the mechanics' lien statutes
cannot stand because it is contrary to that general purpose. That view, however, is at
odds with the settled principle that "compliance with the [procedural provisions of the
mechanics' lien] statute[s] is required before a party is entitled to the benefits created
by the statutefs]." AAA Fencing Company v. Raintree Development and Energy
Company, 714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1989).
In short, the general purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes to protect those who
have enhanced the value of property by supplying materials or labor does not permit a
court or lien claimant to ignore procedural requirements in the statutory scheme that are
designed to protect the homeowner as opposed to the lien claimant. Given that a
"mechanics' lien is a creature of statute," AAA Fencing Company, 714 P.2d at 291, the
legislature is free to enact whatever procedural prerequisites to enforcement of a lien
and recovery of costs and attorney fees it believes are appropriate. Indeed, prior to the
enactment of subsection (4)(a), the legislature had imposed other procedural
requirements on the lien claimant, noncompliance with which results in a bar to
enforcement of the lien or to the recovery of costs and attorney fees. See, e.g., UTAH
CODE ANN. § 38-1-11(1) (2005) (setting forth the time period for commencing an action
to enforce a lien, which must be complied with or the lien is invalidated, as this Court
held in,4A4 Fencing Company); UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-7(3)(c) (2005) ("Failure to
deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record owner precludes the

lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed owner or
record owner in an action to enforce the lien.").
In light of the foregoing, the court of appeals' construction of the plain language
of subsection (4)(a) does not undermine the purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes
simply because it is detrimental to Hart's position in this case (that is, to his effort to
collect prejudgment interest and attorney fees). Contrary to Hart's contention, the
result is not a windfall for Sill.
Hart first complains that the court of appeals' decision unfairly eliminates
prejudgment interest owed by Sill. What Hart fails to disclose, however, is that under
Utah law he could have asked the jury to include prejudgment interest in the damages
awarded on his unjust enrichment claim. See Shoreline Development, Inc. v. Utah
County, 835 P.2d 207, 212 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("we hold that prejudgment interest
must be sought directly as damages in unjust enrichment cases"). He did not do that,
electing to tie the prejudgment interest request exclusively to the mechanics' lien action.
As for his additional complaint that reversal of the attorney fee award unfairly penalizes
him, the penalty imposed for his procedural default (i.e., failure to comply with
subsection (4)(a)) is no more severe than the penalty the legislature has seen fit to
impose for similar procedural defaults. For example, as previously noted, a lien
claimant's "failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record
owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees
* * * in an action to enforce the lien." § 38-l-7(3)(c).

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should affirm the court of appeals'
holding that subsection (4)(a) applied to Hart's counterclaim complaint, which instituted
an action to enforce his mechanics' lien against Sill's property.
CROSS-PETITION
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW BY CROSS-PETITIONER
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This Court granted review on one issue presented by cross-petitioner Joel Sill:
1. Whether a counterclaimant's failure to comply with UTAH CODE ANN. §38-1ll(4)(a) creates a jurisdictional bar to adjudication of an action to enforce a lien.
On certiorari, this Court "review[s] the decision of the court of appeals, not the
trial court." Aris Vision Institute, Inc. v. Wasatch Property Management, Inc., 2006
UT 38, f 7,

P.3d

(citing Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004

UT 23, if 11, 89 P.3d 155). The court of appeals' interpretation of a statute is
reviewed for correctness. Id. (citing State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, \ 6, 63 P.3d
667).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under the plain language of subsections (4)(a) and (e), a lien claimant's failure
to comply with the requirements of subsection (4)(a) upon filing an action to enforce a
mechanics' lien results in a jurisdictional bar to that action. The statute is
straightforward: If the lien claimant fails to comply with subsection (4)(a), the lien

claimant is barred from both maintaining and enforcing the lien. The statutory bar on
maintenance of the lien results in an extinguishment of the lien at the point of the lien
claimant's failure to comply with (4)(a). Based on settled case law from this Court,
noncompliance with subsection (4)(a) therefore creates a jurisdictional bar to
adjudication of an action to enforce a lien. The court of appeals erred in concluding
otherwise.
ARGUMENT
The court of appeals erred in holding that subsection (4)(a) is not jurisdictional by
misinterpreting and misapplying this Court's controlling case law,
A.

Introduction
As discussed above, the court of appeals interpreted subsection (4)(a) to apply to

Hart, holding that under the plain language of that provision he was required to include
with service of his counterclaim on Sill certain instructions and papers related to the
LRFA. Then, based on its recent decision in Pearson v. Lamb, 2005 UT App 383, 121
P.3d 717, the court rejected Sill's argument that under the plain language of section 38l-ll(4)(e), the result of Hart's noncompliance with subsection (4)(a) was a
jurisdictional bar to Hart's mechanics' lien foreclosure action. Instead, the court
viewed Hart's noncompliance with (4)(a) as an affirmative defense for Sill and
remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings on that defense. As
explained below, the court's holding in the instant case that subsection (4)(a) is not
jurisdictional is contrary to the plain language of subsection (4)(e). The Pearson

court's analysis of the jurisdictional question, upon which that holding rests, is deficient
in numerous respects.
Subsection (4)(e) says that "[i]f a lien claimant fails to provide the owner of the
residence the instructions and form affidavit required by subsection 4(a), the lien
claimant shall be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the residence."
Reading subsections (4)(a) and (4)(e) together, the statutory scheme is straightforward:
A lien claimant who files an action to enforce a lien is required to serve the sued
homeowner with certain papers and if the lien claimant fails to do that, both
maintenance and enforcement of the lien are barred. That scheme has all the hallmarks
of a jurisdictional bar. Nonetheless, the court of appeals, applying Pearson, rejected
the argument that (4)(a) is jurisdictional. Sill, 2005 UT App 537, 1 14.
In Pearson, "[t]he only issue before the court [was] whether [the contractor's]
failure to comply with section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) of the Mechanics' Liens Act divested the
trial court of jurisdiction to hear [the contractor's] mechanics' lien foreclosure action."
Pearson, 2005 UT App 383, \ 4. The Pearson court held that that failure "did not
divest the trial court of jurisdiction" because subsection (4)(a) is not mandatory but
merely directory, and thus is not jurisdictional. Id. at t t 12, 15. The court
characterized subsection (4)(a)'s requirements as "'wholly informational' and but 'a
minor component' of the Mechanics' Liens Act." Id. at \ 12 (citing Labelle v. McKay
Dee Hospital Center, 2004 UT 15, 1 17, 89 P.3d 113). In arriving at those
conclusions, the Pearson court overlooked several critical points of law.

B.

In interpreting subsections (4) (a) and (e), the Pearson court
overlooked two elementary rules of statutory construction: (1) statutes
are to be construed according to their plain language, and (2) statutes
must be interpreted to give meaning to all parts, so as to avoid
rendering part of a statute superfluous.
Well before the court of appeals decided the Pearson case, this Court had

adopted a methodology for determining whether a statutory procedural requirement is
jurisdictional. Whether such a requirement is jurisdictional depends on whether it is
"mandatory" (jurisdictional) or merely "directory" (not jurisdictional). Beaver County
v. Utah State Tax Commission, 919 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah 1996). A court is "guided in
construing the language of [a] statute by the principle that generally a direction in a
statute to do an act is considered 'mandatory' when consequences are attached to the
failure to act. Conversely, when a statute requires an action to be taken without
prescribing a penalty for failure to so act, the requirement is not often deemed
mandatory." Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980).
Applying those principles in examining subsections (4)(a) and (e), it is plain that
subsection (4)(a) is a mandatory, and thus jurisdictional, provision. Those subsections
require that a lien claimant do an act (v/z., include with service of the lien foreclosure
complaint on the homeowner certain papers concerning the LRFA) and expressly attach
consequences to the failure to do the prescribed act (viz., the lien claimant is barred
from maintaining or enforcing the lien). In that sense, subsections (4)(a) and (e) are
identical to the statutes at issue in Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988)
(construing the notice of claim provisions in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act),

because they all contain a condition to suit which, when not satisfied, deprives the trial
court of jurisdiction. As this Court explained in Madsen:
Section 63-30-11 sets out the notice requirement [for filing suit against a
governmental entity], and section 63-30-12 spells out the effect of failing
to comply with the requirement [("A claim against the state is barred
unless notice of claim is filed with the attorney general and the agency
concerned within one year after the cause of action arises.")]. Section 6330-11 provides that before a plaintiff may maintain an action against the
State, he or she must file a notice of claim with the appropriate state
entity. Section 63-30-12 provides that an action against the State is barred
if the required notice is not filed. It therefore makes failure to give notice
grounds for dismissal. A plain reading of those sections indicates that no
suit against the State may be maintained if notice is not given. We
therefore conclude that service of notice is a precondition to suit.
769 P.2d at 249 (footnotes and citations omitted).
Like the statutory notice requirement discussed in Madsen, the requirements of
subsection (4)(a) are a condition to suit. And like the statutes in Madsen, subsection
(4)(e) provides that a suit is "barred" if that condition is not satisfied. Thus, a lien
claimant's failure to satisfy the statutory condition to suit contained in subsection (4)(a)
deprives the trial court of jurisdiction. See Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT
7, 1 10, 67 P.3d 466 ("A plaintiffs failure to comply with the [Utah Governmental
Immunity Actj's notice of claim provisions deprives the trial court of subject matter
jurisdiction."); Madsen, 769 P.2d at 250 ("Because the plaintiffs in Madsen I did not
give the required notice and therefore failed to satisfy a precondition to suit, the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of their claim."). Moreover, given that
a failure to comply with subsection (4)(a) results in a bar to maintaining the lien, in
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addition to the bar to enforcement of the lien, the lien is invalidated or extinguished by
the failure to comply with subsection (4)(e). That is akin to the extinguishment of the
lien this Court has held occurs after the statutory period for bringing an action to
enforce a mechanics' lien has run, which results in a jurisdictional bar to enforcement
of the lien. See AAA Fencing Company, 714 P.2d at 291-92.
The Pearson court erred in concluding otherwise, and that error made its way
into the instant case. Significantly, the Pearson court mentioned subsection (4)(e) just
once in its opinion, in the paragraph setting forth appellant Lamb's argument on appeal.
The court never analyzed the plain language of (4)(e), choosing instead to decide the
issue of whether subsection (4)(a) is mandatory or merely directory by "balancing] a
laborer's right to be paid for his labor and materials with the negative impact that liens
have on an owner's credit and her ability to convey clear title." Pearson, 2005 UT
App 383, f 8. The court imported that balancing analysis from Projects Unlimited,
Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1990), where this
Court held that a lien claimant had substantially complied with the statutory notice of
lien requirement and thus technical errors in complying with that requirement did not
render the mechanics' lien notice invalid.
"Statutes are to be construed according to their plain language." LKL
Associates, Inc. v. Farley, 2004 UT 51, ! 7, 94 P.3d 279. A court "interprets statutes
to give meaning to all parts, and avoids rendering portions of the statute superfluous."
Id. Indeed, the legislature's intent is derived from the plain language of a statute:

Our court has held that when interpreting statutes, our primary goal
is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature. The plain
language of the statute provides us the road map to the statute's meaning,
helping to clarify the intent and purpose behind its enactment. When
reading the statutory language, our purpose is to render all parts of the
statute relevant and meaningful, and thus, we presume the legislature used
each term advisedly and according to its ordinary meaning. As a result,
we avoid interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous
or inoperative.
As is the case in construing statutes, this court's rules of practice
and procedure require close attention to their exact language. It is an
elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to
every word, clause and sentence of a statute. No clause, sentence or
word shall be construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if the
construction can be found which will give force to and preserve all the
words of the statute.
State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, \\ 52-53, 63 P.3d 621 (internal quotation
marks, citations, brackets, and ellipses omitted) (emphasis added).
In not analyzing the plain language of subsection (4)(e), the Pearson court
overlooked the foregoing settled rules of statutory construction. Subsection (4)(e) is an
unambiguous, express mandate from the legislature: If a lien claimant fails to comply
with subsection (4)(a), maintenance and enforcement of the mechanics' lien are
"barred." The Pearson court simply ignored that language. See LKL Associates, 2004
UT 51, f 8 ("While [the owners'] argument might represent good policy, the statutory
language clearly limits the [LRFA's] protections to either the typical single-family
home, or a duplex. In order for this court to accept the owners' position and affirm the
trial court, we would be forced to ignore a clear statutory mandate and render the
definition chosen by the legislature meaningless.").

Furthermore, in electing to apply the balancing analysis employed in Projects
Unlimited, the Pearson court overlooked this Court's conditional language in that case,
which prefaced its conclusion that technical errors in complying with the notice
provision of the mechanics' lien statutes did not invalidate the notice: "[W]e have
stated that '[a] lien once acquired by labor performed on a building with the consent of
the owner should not . . . be defeated by technicalities, when no rights of others are
infringed, and no express command of the statute is disregarded." Projects Unlimited,
798 P.2d at 744 (quoting Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 249, 87 P. 713,
716 (1906)) (emphasis added). Unlike the notice provision at issue in Projects
Unlimited, there is an express statutory command with respect to a lien claimant's
failure to comply with subsection (4)(a) - namely, subsection (4)(e)'s mandate that
maintenance and enforcement of the lien are barred. The Pearson court ignored that
command.
C.

The Pearson court overlooked the two-pronged consequence of failing
to comply with subsection (4) (a) in concluding that that provision is
not "mandatory55 because a dismissal of the mechanics' lien action
could be remedied by refiling or through Utah's savings statute.
In support of its holding that subsection (4)(a) is neither mandatory nor

jurisdictional, the Pearson court stated that "the procedures set forth in section 38-1ll(4)(a) are not 'mandatory' because no consequences attach to the failure to act."
Pearson, 2005 UT App 383 at f 9. That, of course, is not literally true, as subsection
(4)(e) sets out the direct consequence for failing to comply with subsection (4)(a). The

court reasoned, however, that because a dismissal of the contractor's mechanics' lien
action could be remedied by refiling or through Utah's savings statute (UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-12-40 (2002)), there are effectively no consequences for not complying with
subsection (4)(a), and thus that provision is neither mandatory nor jurisdictional.
In adopting that reasoning, however, the court overlooked the two-pronged
consequence of failing to comply with subsection (4)(a). The first and foremost
consequence under subsection (4)(e) is that "the lien claimant shall be barred from
maintaining * * * the lien upon the residence." As previously noted, the lien is
therefore extinguished at the point of the lien claimaint's failure to comply with
subsection (4)(a). Thus, contrary to what the Pearson court concluded, after the
procedural default there is no lien upon which to refile an enforcement action.
D.

The Pearson court's reliance on Labette v. McKay Dee Hospital Center, 2004
UT 15, 89 P.3d 113, was misplaced.
In holding that subsection (4)(a) is not jurisdictional, the Pearson court relied

heavily on Labelle v. McKay Dee Hospital Center, 2004 UT 15, 89 P.3d 113. In
Labelle, this Court held that a mailing requirement of the Medical Malpractice Act was
not jurisdictional - a requirement the Court described as "wholly informational" and "a
minor component of the Malpractice Act's prelitigation scheme." Labelle, 2004 UT 15
at t 17. The Pearson court likened the requirements of subsection (4)(a) to the mailing
requirement of the Malpractice Act, calling those requirements "'wholly informational'

and but 'a minor component' of the Mechanics' Liens Act." Pearson, 2005 UT App
383 at 1 12.
The problem with comparing subsection (4)(a) to the statutory mailing
requirement construed in Labelle is that the Malpractice Act does not contain a
"consequence" provision like subsection (4)(e) that reveals a legislative intent to bar a
malpractice action based on one's failure to comply with the mailing requirement.
Indeed, this Court made that point clear at the outset of its analysis in Labelle:
The language and structure of the Malpractice Act offer scant
evidence of an intention to condition the exercise of the district court's
subject matter jurisdiction on compliance with the mailing requirement.
2004 UT 15 at if 8. Just the opposite is true with respect to subsection (4)(a), given the
plain language of subsection (4)(e). The Pearson court overlooked that critical
distinction between Labelle and the case before it. Even if the Pearson court
considered the requirements of subsection (4)(a) to be a minor component of the
mechanics' lien statutes, the legislature certainly did not think that, as evidenced by the
serious consequences it decided to attach to the failure to comply with those
requirements (as set forth in subsection (4)(e)).
E.

The Pearson court mistakenly concluded that prejudice was a relevant
consideration in the determination of whether subsection (4) (a) is
jurisdictional.
In several parts of the Pearson court's opinion, it suggested that the homeowner

had to show she was prejudiced by the contractor's failure to comply with subsection
(4)(a) in order to establish that that provision is jurisdictional. See Pearson, 2005 UT

App 383 at f 12 ("Defendant has not alleged that she was prejudiced.") & f 14
("Furthermore, Defendant did not allege how the instructions and form affidavit
required by section 38-1-11(a) [sic] would have conferred any demonstrable value here,
but instead argued that such value (or lack thereof) was 'irrelevant' and 'of no
import.'"). That suggestion is legally incorrect, as a showing of prejudice is
unnecessary if the statute is jurisdictional. See, e.g., Lyons v. Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey, 643 N.Y.S.2d 571, 571-72 (A.D. 1996) ("The fact that the Port
Authority may not have been prejudiced by the plaintiff's failure to comply with the
statute is immaterial, since the requirement is jurisdictional and must be strictly
construed."). Thus, the court mistakenly incorporated prejudice as a consideration in
its analysis of whether subsection (4)(a) is jurisdictional.
F.

Summary
In sum, the court of appeals' analysis of the jurisdictional question - as set out in

Pearson and incorporated into this case - is fatally flawed. This Court therefore should
reject that analysis and hold that subsection (4)(a) is a jurisdictional provision.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the Court should reverse the court of appeals'
holding that subsection (4)(a) does not create a jurisdictional bar to enforcement of a
lien where the lien claimant fails to comply with the requirements of that provision.
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